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ABSTRACT 
This article studies the contours of law knowledge and the scientific field. In 
methodological terms, make use of literature that highlights some law works 
contributions epistemic, theoretical and methodological of each author to the law 
field. It concludes that the law knowledge can be understand as a field of 
coexistence. The other contribution is that the article introduces an analytical model 
for future researches and the scientific validity claimed for the law field is associated 
to the each approaches analyzed. 
 
KEYWORDS: Science of Law; Epistemological Contributions; Theoretical 
Contributions; Methodological Contributions; Legal Epistemology. 
 
 
RESUMO  
Este artigo encontra lugar no debate sempre inacabado em torno da cientificidade no 
campo jurídico. Neste sentido, o objetivo do artigo é refletir acerca dos contornos do 
conhecimento jurídico e da cientificidade do campo. Para tanto, este artigo teórico 
apoia-se em uma pesquisa bibliográfica que destaca de algumas obras jurídicas as 
contribuições epistêmicas, teóricas e metodológicas de cada autor para o campo. A 
principal conclusão alcançada está associada ao fato de que o conhecimento jurídico 
precisa ser apreendido como um campo de coexistência, não como um bloco 
monolítico. A outra contribuição é que o artigo torna público um modesto modelo 
analítico para estudos futuros que aprofundem o debate aqui iniciado. E por fim, 
conclui-se que a cientificidade reivindicada para o campo jurídico varia conforme as 
abordagens de cada autor analisado. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: ciência do direito; contribuições epistêmicas; contribuições 
teóricas; contribuições metodológicas; epistemologia jurídica. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The construction of legal knowledge and field scientificity is historically trailer 
to at least two epistemic fundamental - rationalism and empiricism - as if both are 
radically dissociate from one another. This dissociation becomes one of the main 
obstacles to a dialogical epistemology, capable of promoting the coexistence 
between the two fundamental consolidated by classical reductionist epistemology. In 
this sense, it makes sense an investigation that aims to reflect on the contours of 
legal knowledge and field scientificity in order to make visible that law knowledge 
needs to be understand not as a monolithic block and peaceful, but, unlike, as a field 
of coexistence from senses and of interest epistemic, theoretical and methodological. 
Thus, this theoretical article is, based on a bibliographical research aimed at 
identifying the epistemic, theoretical and methodological contributions of some 
authors in the law field1. Therefore, four works produced by authors in different 
contexts and historical moments were select. The choice of these authors anchored 
in the need to present the law field not as a homogeneous field, but as a field, that 
allows the coexistence of varied epistemological matrices. There is an intentional 
foundation in the choice of works, for it starts from a matrix epistemological more 
focused in norm - Kelsen - until arriving at more pluralistic matrices, which transcend 
to the norm - Boaventura de Sousa Santos, passing through Ross and Warat.  
In addition to the introduction and the final considerations, the article is 
structured the following form: the first section presents some notes on scientificity in 
the law field. Based on Bombassaro (1992), Encabo (2009) and Burawoy (2006), we 
draws up an illustrative picture that evidences three epistemological tendencies: 
analytical, historical and dialogical, understood as living phenomena, which 
interrelate and influence each other. In the following sections (second, third, fourth 
and fifth) become visible on the contributions and limits for the law field of the 
investigative programs of Kelsen (2009), Ross (2007), Warat (2002) and Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos (1988) ). In the sixth section, presents a summary table containing 
the main constituent elements of scientificity in the law field based on the 
                                                 
1 We to be grateful for of the Masters students of Law of the UNICURITIBA, who participated in the 
Seminars in the discipline of Epistemology and Methodology of Legal Knowledge, class 2013. 
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investigative programs of each author analyzed. 
 
 
2  NOTES ON SCIENCE 
 
Plato's famous allegory of the cave (1999) is still current in the debate around 
epistemology, be it with rationalist, deductive, invented a priori, or empiricist, 
inductive, invented a posteriori. An epistemology inspired by rationalism, because it 
constituted a priori, does not take into account the empirical, as it would lead an 
epistemology centers on empirical, a posteriori. 
Plato's emphasis on the escape from the cave reveals his clearly rationalist 
preference, since valid knowledge for him is not knowledge derived from the 
contingencies of the empirical but from the domain of ideas. The world of 
contingencies is the world of “doxa”, of vulgarity, of ephemeral, of the deepest 
darkness of the cavern. Overcoming this world of shadows is tantamount to moving 
in the direction of the world of pure ideas, of the episteme.   
Without this idea of epistemic purity losing importance, in the transition period 
between the Middle and Modern Ages, break out an alternative epistemology; this 
time focus no more on the escape of the cave, but on a deep dive in the interior of 
the same. Unleash an empiricist epistemology derived from experimental and 
inductive knowledge emerges that helps to define the contours of Modern Physics 
and to project it as a reference for knowledge characterized as scientificity from that 
context. The condition of this unique way of producing knowledge becomes the main 
criterion defining the validity or not of field knowledge. In this sense, the reductionist 
episteme of physics popularized by Galileo (1999) is the result of the consolidation of 
a practice focused on experimentation and induction. However, once instituted, this 
alternative epistemology acquires a relative autonomy relative to the practice and 
begins to exert influence on the field itself. The practice instituted by Galileo founds 
an epistemology that, in turn, (re) founds the practice in a “autopoiese” movement. 
Reasoning may been taken to the other fields of knowledge; is what we will see, for 
example, with the legal field. 
In summary, if we take as reference these two epistemic fundamentals – 
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rationalism and empiricism - the scientificity was trailer to each of them as if they 
were radically dissociated from each other. This dissociation erupts as one of the 
main epistemological obstacles (BACHELARD, 1974) to be overcome by a more 
open epistemology, dialogic and capable of promoting coexistence between the two 
fundamentals’ consolidated by classical reductionist epistemology. 
 
2.1  EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS IN THE LEGAL FIELD 
 
In the epistemic perspective, it should be clarified that the legal field, like 
other fields of knowledge, it cannot be understood as a monolithic block without 
internal disputes and tensions. Taking as reference the two epistemic matrices 
presented above, it may be possible to affirm that there is a predominance of an 
epistemology with a greater emphasis on rationalism in the legal field. This statement 
is associated with the fact that the structuralist epistemic tendency, which has Kelsen 
(2009) as one of the main founders, is predominant. In structuralism epistemic 
tendency, is self-sufficient, apart from the concrete, external world. 
The knowledge recognized as valid is one that stands in logical terms, true to 
the Grundnorm invented by Kelsen and taken as a reference both by his followers 
and by some of his opponents. Any knowledge that distances itself from this hard 
core has difficulty claiming valid knowledge status, since the contours of the legal 
field where been delineated very consistently. The empiricist epistemic tendencies, 
although less visible, are fundamental to the field of law knowledge. If in the first 
tendency, knowledge derived from a retracted or enclosed right is almost lifeless 
knowledge, in the second tendency, the murmur of reality nourishes and gives life to 
legal knowledge. 
This means that if in the rationalist tendency, the founding and instituting 
criterion of the validity of legal knowledge is formal logic, in the empiricist tendency, 
besides logic, the impact to arouse from applying the norm in the world were taken 
into account. 
The law knowledge that simultaneously produces - and are produce - by an 
empiricist episteme never claims isolation, but on reverse ever-closer contacts with 
other fields of knowledge, such as Sociology, Anthropology, Biology, genuine, popular 
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knowledge etc. 
The production of legal knowledge, based on empiricist fundamentals, founds 
an alternative episteme for the legal field. Once established, this new episteme, due 
to its more open and sensitive nature to other fields of knowledge, serves not policing 
or enclosure, but a source of feedback and inspiration for legal knowledge. 
 
2.2 RATIONALIST TREND  
 
It is a trend centers on the binomial hypothesis-deduction, elaborated a priori, 
as an analytical model that serves as a guide for the processes of production, access 
and validation of field knowledge. The claim of any knowledge must have the 
approval of this field that must be close to or aligned with the foundational guide of 
the field itself.  The contours of the field are define from the guide. The link of 
knowledge produced with this episteme is fundamentally logical, formal. In this 
particular case, in the legal field, whenever a "legal operator" (judge, prosecutor, 
lawyer) applies a positive norm, its central concern is related to the coherence of the 
same in relation to what Kelsen calls Grundnorm, not necessarily with the refutations 
In the concrete world. Any study that proposes to evaluate the constitutionality of a 
law, decree, etc. Tends to produce knowledge adhering to this hypothetical-deductive 
episteme. 
 
2.3 EMPIRICAL TRENDENCY 
 
It is an inductive trend, elaborated throughout and posteriori the research. 
The knowledge derived from this epistemic fundamental go being constitute 
throughout the research. If in the rationalist tendency, the main protagonist is the 
"cognoscent subject", in the empiricist tendency, the "object" becomes the central 
protagonist. 
In the legal field, the researches that take as a starting point the 
jurisprudence are directly associated with this epistemic fundamental. It is an 
investigation focus on the positive norm, which singularity it as a legal research, 
however, it is an investigation of the norm in action - which has already been 
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effectively or is being applied - not an investigation of the norm recorded in books  as 
the rationalist tendency prescribes. 
 
2.4  DIALOGICAL TREDENCY 
 
Differently from the reductionist epistemology, which is constituted and 
consolidated through two strongly dissociated tendencies, contemporary 
epistemology has been constituting and consolidating itself as a field of coexistence 
(SOUZA-LIMA and KNECHTEL, 2012), which studies the forms and conditions. 
 A field of knowledge produces, allows access and validates both internally 
and publicly the knowledge (BURAWOY, 2006; ENCOBO, 2009). Taking 
epistemology as a field of coexistence involve situating it not in the vanguard, but in 
the rearward of the definitive knowledge of the contours of a determined field of 
knowledge. Situating the epistemology in the rearward implies admitting it is as a 
living field of investigation that in a recursive way, at the same time that produces the 
field are produce by it. Its means an epistemology that is inside and outside of the 
field, so, without giving up the internal criteria that singularity each field of knowledge, 
it opens to society in search of legitimacy external to the field. An epistemology of 
coexistence has a supposed to be the principle that ends and means must be 
justifiable. It is an epistemic fundamental whose effort is associated not with the need 
to separate but to bring the rational and empiricist fundamentals approach together.  
Here, the a priori or a posteriori model of knowledge is less important, for the 
openness of the “cognoscente” subject (SOUZA-LIMA, BRAGA and SILVA, 2013) 
matters much more to the clamours and indicators of reality. 
 In the law field, the norm can be apprehend not only in its instituted aspect, 
but also in its instituting, living aspect, capable of producing reality. 
Figure 1 summarizes the main constituent and constituent elements of the 
two hegemonic epistemological tendencies and an alternative epistemology that is 
constitute through coexistence between the other two. 
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FIGURE 1: EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRENDENCIES. 
SOURCES: Prepared from Bombassaro (1992); Encabo (2009); Burawoy (2006). 
 
The three epistemological tendencies are arrange in a horizontal perspective 
with the purpose of emphasizing that tendencies that need apprehended as living 
phenomena, that be interrelate and influence each other. Horizontality attempts to 
dispel linear and "progressive" readings of trends in contemporary research. There is 
not one tendency worse or better than another a priori; it is up to the researcher to 
make his choice in accordance with his interests, beliefs and concrete context of the 
investigation. This is what we will see in the following sections. 
 
 
3 THE SCIENTIFICITY OF KELSEN 
 
Taking into account the discussion in section 1, the idea-force in this section 
is to make visible the contributions and limitations of Kelsen's research program for 
the legal field. 
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3.1 CONTRIBUTION OF KELSEN 
 
The founding element that makes it possible to delineate the contours of the 
Kelsenian epistemology is the rationalism, presented and popularized like 
fundamental norm or Grundnorm. In establishing this archmedical point, Kelsen 
makes it well marked that any knowledge that pretend to claim the seal of legitimacy 
of the legal field need be in tune with this archmedical point. It is an absolute formal 
rationality, but it defines a specific epistemic statute for the own legal field. 
 
3.1.1 Epistemic fundamental 
 
Kelsen's founder question, "what is law?" Is revealing of his philosophical 
inclinations with a view to instituting epistemological canons for the legal field. 
This is a question, which in propose out to describe what "is the law", claims 
a pure theory and, in function of this, ignores any concern with what "should be law". 
The knowledge constructed in the light of this question will be knowledge whose limit 
is the description of legal practices without any concerns that transcend this 
predefined limit. Questions derived from the background questions posed by Kelsen: 
does it make any sense to claim a pure theory for the legal field? 
From Kelsen's perspective, it makes sense, as his starting point is what 
standard, operator of law and fact intertwine and separate without any reciprocal 
influence. The description made by the researcher of the legal field does not deny the 
existence of reciprocal influences, but on opposite, does not consider them. It is not a 
question of denying the impossibility of describing without prescribing, but of not 
considering this fact.  
With the background of questions, Kelsen believes that he has separated the 
law from all focus of contamination and external impurities and has founded a 
science of law (positive) - not a policy of law - capable of describing the applications 
fulfilled by the operators of law. Kelsen, in alignment with the tradition of German 
social thought, places the field of law knowledge in the broader field of the spirit 
sciences - for Weber (1977), sciences of culture - not in the physical sciences, and 
this is enough to understand his choice by description rather than the explanation of 
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legal phenomena. If the explanation has a privileged place in the physical sciences, 
since them been institute and consolidated through the investigation of cause and 
effect relationships between physical phenomena. In the field of the sciences of the 
spirit it does not make sense to try to investigate these same relations for a very 
reason Simple, they do not exist. Against this limit, Kelsen presents as more 
appropriate to speak of description a legal phenomenon that, strictly speaking, 
implies describing how a legal operator confers or "lends" a law sense to a specific 
social fact. Kelsen's belief seems to be that it is possible to describe without 
interfering in a phenomenon; it is possible to describe without prescribing; It is 
possible to describe without contaminate both in the sense of the objective attributed 
a priori to the positive norm and the specific social fact.  
This notion of a pure description and simple of legal practice serves as a 
reinforcement of the usual idea of taking the magistrate (judge, prosecutor, lawyer, 
etc.) as the "operator of the law". Since this is described by the scholar of the legal 
field as if he were an automaton , fully stripped of interests,  will  and whims simply, 
whenever necessary, resort to the norm warehouse, just as a tool is used (a hammer, 
for example), with the purpose of stamping with the legal seal a specific phenomenon 
. After performing its mechanical task, it returns the tool - the norm - to the warehouse 
and waits for the next task. The description of the fact by the scholar of the legal field, 
to be take into account, must claim the utmost neutrality. After the contact involving 
norm, operator and fact, each of them returns to their places of origin as if nothing 
had happened. Following this mechanistic fundamental, there is no reciprocal 
interference and if there is no reciprocal interference, there is no coevolution 
(NORGAARD, 1994; SOUZA-LIMA, 2012), a founding element of the dialogical 
tendency (Figure 1). Taking coevolution as an epistemic fundamental implies taking 
the positive norm not as a dead phenomenon, but alive and capable of influencing 
and being influence by reality data.  In this perspective, the scientificity claimed for 
law knowledge, constructed in the light of Kelsen's epistemic program, is only 
possible if any evidence of external contamination, coevolution, is denied in a radical 
way.  
Kelsen's horror to the various forms of contamination of the legal field must to 
be fetch in some of the most important influences he has assimilated throughout his 
Revista Jurídica                     vol. 02, n°. 47, Curitiba, 2017. pp. 433-467 
                                                                       DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.5187595 
  _________________________________________ 
 
443 
 
intellectual trajectory.. In addition to the influences absorbed by Kant's (1999) 
knowledge theory and Nietzsche's (1983) It is undeniable demystifying force, the 
undeclared presence of Weber's (1980) rationalist sociology in Kelsen's formulations 
is undeniable. In this line of reasoning, focused on a rationalistic epistemic 
fundamental - invented by the human mind -, Morrison (2006, p.383), an important 
scholar of the philosophy of law and, in particular, of the works of Kelsen, states that 
the Viennese jurist. “[...] constructs this system not to remove humanity from this 
legal enterprise, (...) but to make us understand that the law has nothing to advance it 
except human projects”. 
The excerpt cut off from Morrison becomes visible strive of Kelsen in 
recognizing that taking into account the essential freedom of Homo sapiens implies 
recognizing that society is distinct from nature. .Here Kelsen dissociates the natural 
science of social science, claiming a proper method for the science of law, without 
the influence of physical science. As a good scholar of Kant, he resumes the human 
as a sine qua non of transcendence in the face of the obstacles posed by the 
biophysical environment. As a good scholar of Kant, the human is for him taken over 
as condition sine qua non of transcendence in the face of the obstacles placed by the 
biophysical environment. Kelsen's theory, if it accepts its claim to dissociation from 
Homo sapiens in relation to the biophysical environment, is a "phenomenological 
description that seeks to bring to light what is essentially human in the law order - the 
inner or normative aspect" (MORRISON, 2006, p. 385). 
 Kelsen made a point of making public his clamour for an exacerbated 
intention of neutrality as a founding element of the science of law. Pure theory is an 
adaptation of Kant's rationalist-critical episteme to the episteme delineating the 
contours of a science of law. If reality will never be achieved, it is necessary to create 
categories to apprehend phenomenological levels of this reality, these are the 
procedures (to achieve the legal phenomenon), which are equivalent to the 
categories of the epistemic system inherited from Kant. A pure science of law must 
not justify anything, since every justification presupposes value judgment and other 
emotional factors, which beside escape, since projected as obstacles to the deeper 
scope of knowledge with scientificity pretensions, the neutral description of legal 
phenomena. 
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3.1.2  Theoretical Fundamental 
 
The theory derived from Grundnorm it cannot let if contaminated by other 
fields of knowledge, much less by data or indicators of empirical reality. Kelsen was 
one of the most emphatic writers in his declaration of war on metaphysics or any 
external source of contamination of the legal field, such as political ideology, physical 
sciences, ethics, economics, psychology, and sociology. With this, the Viennese 
author founded his pure theory of law, which in its own terms, 
 
 
Like theory, unique only to know its own object. It tries to answer this 
question: what is and how is the Law? However, you no longer care about 
the question of how the Law should be, or how it should be done. It is a legal 
and not a political science of law (KELSEN, 2012, p.1) 
 
 
The excerpt is revealing of Kelsen's obstinacy in explaining the fundamental 
that allow delineating the contours of a theoretical field exclusive to the legal 
phenomenon. His claim is associated with the necessity of founding a positive theory 
(in the sense used by Saint-Simon, Comte, and Durkheim in Sociology also 
emerging), with its own object and method, centers on the ideas of objectivity and 
exactitude. The excerpt reveals that, in spite of its need to characterize the legal field 
as a science of the spirit (German tradition), the physical sciences are the references 
of scientificity fields consolidated in the context in which it is constructing his theory. 
There is a similarity between Kelsen in the legal field and Durkheim (2002) in 
the sociological field, since the French sociologist, engaged in delineating the 
contours of the specific field of study of society, Sociology, did not hesitate to 
eliminate or dismiss all possible sources of contamination. Durkheim (2002, p.127-8), 
in the conclusion of his classic book "The Rules of Sociological Method", makes 
explicit his concerns about the purity of the sociological field by admitting. 
 
 
[...] that the moment has come for Sociology to renounce to worldly 
successes, taking the esoteric character that is appropriate to all science. 
What he would lose in popularity would thus gain in dignity and authority. For 
as long as it remains mixed with partisan struggles, so long as it is satisfied 
with the elaboration of common ideas by employing a logic more elaborate 
than that of the common people alone, and so long as it assumes no special 
competence for the individuals who worship it. It will not be in a position to 
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speak with enough strength and to silence passions and prejudices. 
 
  
It is a clamour similar to that of Kelsen, when lay claim to purity for the legal 
field. Both Durkheim and Kelsen could not in that context of emergence and 
consolidation of the two fields of knowledge, make concessions to the most diverse 
kinds of epistemic syncretism, theoretical and methodological syncretism. In Kelsen's 
strong formulation (2012, p. 2) against external focus of contamination it is possible 
to highlight his attempt to "avoid a methodological syncretism that obscures the 
essence of legal science and dilutes the limits imposed on it by the Nature of its 
object". 
The recuperation of the cited excerpt to demonstrate that both authors 
sought inspiration in the already constituted and consolidated sciences, the physical 
sciences, however, did not spare efforts in order to establish own epistemic statutes 
and adapted to the singularity of the two emerging fields. 
 
3.1.3 Methodological fundamental 
 
The methodology with greater adherence to the fundamental norm of Kelsen 
and to the clamour for a pure theory needs to be centralize in processes or logical-
deductive constructions. Any methodological procedure that exposes the field to 
possible metajuridic contaminations needs to be immediately neutralised and 
discarded. 
 
3.2 LIMITS OF KELSEN'S CONTRIBUTION 
 
 At the end of his life, Kelsen recognized some limits of his ambitious pure 
science of law. Grundnorm, considered until 1963 as an epistemic foundation, it’s 
taken as a fiction, for Kelsen himself feels obliged to admit that the "pure" 
foundation is a translation of the will of the legal authorities. This will can range 
from the noblest to the most stakes and caprices that characterize the human 
condition in its most concrete sense. This recognition leads Kelsen inexorably to 
find his historic enemy, legal realism. It is as if he abandoned or minimized old 
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and strong rationalist positions to empiricist positions and less idealized in relation 
to the human condition2. Kelsen tends to move away from his original analytic 
epistemic tendency and to approach the opposite socio-historical tendency 
(Figure 1). 
In summary, Kelsen - alongside Hobbes (1999) and others - was one of 
the main architects of the founding elements of what became world-renowned as 
modern legal positivism, namely: 
 
 The law as a system of norms is a human invention. 
The methodologies lay claim to their own statute based on logic-deductive and value-
free principles. 
The right should not be confused with morality nor with any ideology..  
It is a claim of purity, absence of any external contamination to the field. 
TABLE 1 - FUNDING ELEMENTS OF THE PURE SCIENCE OF LAW 
Source: Kelsen (2009). 
 
 
4 THE SCIENCE IN ROSS 
Taking into account the discussion in section 1, the idea-force of this section 
is to make visible the contribution and limitations of Ross's investigative program to 
the legal field. 
 
4.1 CONTRIBUTION OF ROSS 
 
It is important to emphasize that Ross's contribution comes from on his 
critical dialogue regarding Kelsen's contribution. 
 
 
4.1.1 Epistemic fundamental 
 
Ross's main epistemic contribution to the legal field is associated with the 
choice of an empirical foundation, the legal phenomenon. The choice of an epistemic 
                                                 
2 "Idealism has such a high concept of humanity that it runs the risk of despising human beings" 
(SCHILLER cited by SIMMEL, 2006, p.100). 
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foundation delineates the contours of the knowledge that will be produce and of the 
methodological strategies. 
 
4.1.2 Theoretical fundamentals  
 
The theory derived from this epistemic choice must compulsorily have an 
empirical anchoring; it will be building a posteriori, never a priori. 
 
4.1.3 Metodological fundamental 
 
In the methodological perspective, perhaps the most important contribution of 
Ross to the legal field, strategy it is anchored in the induction, in the broach of the 
epistemic subject (SOUZA-LIMA, SILVA and BRAGA, 2013) of concrete cases. The 
ambition of universality of this knowledge does not exceed the contours of the 
concrete case effectively analyzed. This check does not eliminate the fact that 
knowledge is treat as condition for possibilities or inspiring of new knowledge. 
For the cognoscente empiricist subject, the starting point is the legal 
phenomenon, the right embodied in social practices. The legal phenomenon is a 
tangle involving positive norm and social practice (Figure 2). 
 
 
  
FIGURE 2 - REPRESENTATION OF THE LEGAL PHENOMENON 
 
 
In Accordance to Figure 2, the legal phenomenon would be represented at 
the interface between the system of norms and the social system. What reveals that 
Legal 
Phenomenon 
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a law phenomenon, in Ross's perspective, is the entanglement involving norm and 
society; it is as if Ross was demanding a reality bath for the system of norms. 
Involvement with empirical signals that theoretical approaches need to be 
made in the face of empirical reality data. The criterion of validation of legal 
knowledge, for Ross, is the verificationism inherited from Kant (1999) and hegemonic 
during most of the validity of the Vienna Philosophical Circle (PEPE, 2007). The 
verificationism 
 
 
[...] It is a principle of modern empirical science that a proposition about 
reality, (contrasting with an analytic, logical-mathematical proposition) 
necessarily implies that following a certain procedure, under certain 
conditions, certain direct experiences will result (ROSS, 2007, p.64). 
 
 
The cropped excerpt indicates that legal knowledge conquest the status of 
valid the measure that it translates or makes visible the crossroad, the interface 
between the normative system and the social system. Therefore, valid legal 
knowledge is empirically crystallized knowledge. In Ross's world there is no space for 
any kind of idealization the distance of the observation, for the "real content of the 
propositions of the science of law refers to the actions of the courts under certain 
conditions" (ROSS, 2007, p.65) clearly delimited social, historically and politically. 
As in Ross's formulation, the metaphysical dimension (of ethical value, for 
example), as in Kelsen, is ignored, valid legal knowledge does not necessarily mean 
fair or emancipatory knowledge, but simply a knowledge which is possible and 
capable of the observable empirically. To this description, Ross denominates "law in 
action" or, for him, it is interchangeable, "Current law". It is worth recovering the literal 
understanding of this concept, for it is a key concept for the theoretical formulation 
with anchorage of  empiricism in Ross's  and if it construct, as it moves away from 
the idealistic conception of Kelsen. If for Kelsen, "current law" is limited to the system 
of positive norms, for Ross. 
 
 
It means the abstract set of normative ideas that serves as an interpretive 
schema for the phenomena of law in action, which in turn means that these 
norms are effectively adhered to and that they are because they are 
experienced and felt as socially obligatory (ROSS, 2007, 41). 
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It is possible to identify Ross's cut off excerpt the fidelity to the empiricist 
epistemic fundamentals, for the system of norms isolated, without being 
entanglement in the social system, may be necessary, but it is insufficient. To the 
student of the law field aligned to the proposal of Ross, It is only a matter of reliably 
describing the arguments that sustain and ensures that a positive norm comes into 
action. At this point, Ross is emphatic, "[...] the descriptive terminology has nothing to 
do with approval or condemnation moral” (ROSS, 2007, p.56). It is always fitting to 
recall that at this moment he is in full agreement with Kelsen in declaring war on any 
contamination arising from the field of values, therefore, from ethics. Legal 
knowledge neither prescribes nor judges, it merely describes the observable 
entanglement involving norm and society. 
 
4.2 LIMITS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF ROSS 
 
If, on the one hand, Kelsen declares war on all kinds of syncretism, on the 
other, Ross vehemently rejects eclecticism by fixing his theory on a sociological 
fundamental. The approximation of the two formulations makes it possible to identify 
that both authors claim purity, since if Kelsen calls for a logical-analytical purity, Ross, 
in turn, claims for a sociological purity. If Kelsen's contribution is a debtor of the 
analytic tendency, Ross is distant by remaining true to the socio-historical trend. 
Common among them is fidelity to a reductionist fundamental, a logical-mathematical 
and sociological other. 
 
 
5 THE SCIENCE IN WARAT 
 
Taking into account the discussion in section 1, the idea-force this section is 
to make visible the contribution and limits of Warat's investigative program to the 
legal field. 
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5.1 CONTRIBUTION OF WARAT 
 
In explaining his objective of constructing a critical epistemology for the legal 
field, Warat identifies the main limits of legal dogmatic3 and, from them, proposes 
new constituent elements of a critical epistemology. 
 
5.1.1 Limits of legal dogmatic  
 
If Kelsen and Ross attempt to construct epistemic fields from well-defined 
fundamentals, in the case of the first a rationalist fundamental and the second an 
empiricist fundamental of sociological character, In Warat's perspective there is no 
claim to an archimedical point capable of sustaining and giving meaning to his 
epistemological structure. His claim is oriented to a critical epistemology, which has 
no any foundation a priori and in function of this needs to be analysed in terms not of 
fundamentals, but of its contours. This position of Warat is associated with a radically 
interdisciplinary movement, so pluralist to think the field of legal knowledge. 
The validity of any knowledge produced here is condition to the sieve of social 
reality with its tensions, contradictions and uncertainties. This imperative imposes on 
the researcher or epistemic subject (SOUZA-LIMA, SILVA and BRAGA, 2013) of the 
legal field the need to move to the borders of his disciplinary field. Since he needs to 
realize the law is not summary of the system of positive norms (Rationalist tradition) 
nor to the jurisprudential system, responsible for the application of the norm (realistic 
tradition). 
The displaced to the borders of the field leads the researcher directly into the 
world of facts away from the abstract world of norms in themselves. The fact, always 
wicked by the faithful students to the systems of norms, here loses the bad reputation 
and acquires privileged status for the researcher of borders. According to an author 
very close to Warat, this horror of fact it is evident as an inducer of the postures in 
themselves of many legal scholars: 
 
 
We must recognize that the fact enjoys a bad reputation, because it is 
                                                 
3 Warat refers to the hegemonic legal field as "juridical dogmatics”. 
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always disconcerting. When it is a new fact, it introduces a notion of risk, of 
danger to order, an intolerable notion for the jurist. If the fact is habitual, it is 
suspect that it is the product of a machination devised by private individuals 
to escape the right (ARNAUD, 1991, p.229). 
 
This horror to the fact, highlighted in the above excerpt, has deep 
connections with Nietzsche's (1983) critique of Plato's known "cave allegory" (1999), 
since the  invitation to escape from the cave is interpreted by the German philologist 
as one of more abject acts of cowardice in the face of the real world. For Nietzsche, 
Plato's obsession with fleeing and wanting to bring all the inhabitants of the cave 
together into a supposed world of light and happiness, is nothing more than a 
materialization of the horror of the world tainted by the concrete and contradictory 
facts of all associative life. For Nietzsche, Plato's obsession with fleeing and wanting 
to gather all the inhabitants of the cave into a supposed world of light and happiness 
is nothing more than a materialization of the horror of the world stained by the 
concrete and contradictory facts of all associative life. This horror of possible 
contamination from the facts seems to be the founding element of the claims of 
purity, present in the writings of some legal scholars. Consequently, the horror of fact, 
which is initially important in founding and consolidating an epistemic field, over time, 
becomes an epistemic obstacle, in the sense used by Bachelard (1974). 
In purpose to relativize the strength of this ideology of purity, Warat's 
contribution (2002) is associated with the need to found a legal field that takes into 
account the processes of contamination, since a critical epistemology must be 
attentive to the multiple expressions of the legal phenomenon, not just positive 
standards. 
Inspired in this desire to "desecrate" the legal field, Warat's work is lavish in 
indicators of the limits of law dogmatic, is what we will present in the sequence, in 
they are repertoire in some cut excerpt of Warat's work that serve of indicators of the 
epistemic limits (Table 2), theoretical (Table 3) and methodological (Table 4) of legal 
dogmatic. 
 
 
EPISTEMIC LIMIT PARTS 
Accent playback 1. The dogmatic linked to positive law can only produce a 
reproductive and non-renewing knowledge" (WARAT, 
2002, p.39). 
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Science without 
epistemology 
2. "[...] the legal dogmatic presents itself as a science without 
epistemology, with uncertain contours between rhapsodic 
opinions and systematic reasoning. It is an activity that is 
based more on epidermal and emotional attitudes, 
translated in apparently rigorous reasoning’s, than in an 
authentic work of theorization. We denying it, therefore, 
the status of scientificity. One cannot seek to do today a 
work that intends to display the title of scientist without the 
epistemological level "(WARAT, 2002, p.45). 
Attack on the 
analytical tendency 
of epistemology 
3. “Stuck to an empiricist conception of knowledge, their 
cultivator’s [of analytical philosophy], will use the term 
methodology or epistemology to refer to the 
problematization of the scientificity of legal knowledge 
"(WARAT, 2002, p.48) 
Attack on monismo 4. “[...] The epistemology would have the mission to 
construct a unitary and rigorous system of knowledge on 
the norms and theories with a that it is wanted to describe 
them” (WARAT, 2002, p.48). 
Attack on the 
hegemony of 
empiricism 
5. “It is through the constitution of a rigorous discourse that 
empiricism manages to create the intersubjectivity effect 
that it assumes as objectivity. Appealing to the logical rigor 
of discourse is intended to eliminate subjective 
interference” (WARAT, 2002, p.50). 
TABLE 2: EPISTEMIC LIMITS OF LEGAL DOGMATICS. 
SOURCE: Prepared from Warat (2002). 
 
 
Table 2 they are presented five excerpts that were cut off from work of Warat 
that can be apprehended as indicators of the epistemic limits of legal dogmatic. In 
excerpt 1, he indicates as limit the accent on reproduction, which projects as an 
obstacle to the renewal of the field. In the excerpt 2, he inquired about the possibility 
of a field of knowledge without epistemological fundamentals. In excerpts 3 and 5 he 
spares no criticism of the analytic tendency (Figure 1, Section 2) of epistemology with 
his exaggerated attachment to empiricist fundamentals inherited from the physical 
sciences. In excerpt 4, Warat refines his critique of to the analytical tendency of 
epistemology with his ambition to establish epistemic a monism for all fields of 
knowledge, based on the modus operandi of physics. 
 
 
THEORETICAL 
LIMIT 
PARTS 
Cult of current law. 1. “Legal dogmatic [...] is limited to reproduces and explains the 
content of the law in force, whose legitimation and 
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justification does not question” (WARAT, 2002, p.17). 
Claim of purity 2. “The general theory of law is the summit of the 
systematization of dogmatic and reaches its peak with the 
elaboration of the pure theory of Kelsen that eliminates from 
its womb every metajurídic notion and not only the law 
recognition (axiology). But also the facticity (The facts), 
staying only with the norm and its technical-legal focus, 
which is reduced to the logical demonstration of the validity 
of legal norm” (WARAT, 2002, p.19). 
Axiomatization and 
scientificity 
3. “Dogmatists, who formulate a general theory of law, express 
it with the attributes of axiomatization and scientificity, with 
the affirmation that legal reasoning conforms to the rules of 
strict and formal logic” (WARAT, 2002, p.38). 
TABLE 3: THEORETICAL LIMITS OF LEGAL DOGMATICS. 
SOURCE: Prepared from Warat (2002). 
 
 
Are presented in Table 3, three excerpt of Warat's work that allow us to 
identify theoretical limits of legal dogmatic. In excerpt 1 he draws attention to the 
excessive cult of prevailing law, a hallmark of many theoretical approaches, loyal to 
legal dogmatic. In excerpts 2 and 3, he deepens the criticism begun in excerpt 1, as it 
strikes in a forceful manner both the purity claim and the axiomatization of the legal 
field. 
In Table 4, three cut off excerpt in the of Warat's work are presented, which 
make it possible to make visible the methodological limits of legal dogmatic. In the 
excerpts 1 and 3, Warat attacks methodological monism and the clamour for purity, 
reigning in practices consolidated in the legal field. In the excerpt 2, he points out his 
dissatisfaction with of cult of persuasion, typical of the courts, but taken without 
criticism for the world of the production of legal knowledge. For him, there is a 
confusion to the measure as the cult of persuasion has the featured place in the 
courts, in the academic world, needs to be replaced by inspected, investigative and 
demonstrative practices. 
 
 
METHODOLO
GICAL LIMIT 
PARTS 
Methodological 
Monism 
1 The legal dogmatic requires a work of logic and legal  technique, 
through which would perform operations of analysis and 
synthesis, deduction and induction that would result in a series of 
concepts and principles through which a clear interpretation of 
the legal rules integrating positive law would be obtained. This 
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constructive task is called technical-legal or logical-abstract 
method, considered by legal dogmatics as the only possible 
method in the study of legal science.” (WARAT, 2002, p.16). 
Cult of 
Persuasion 
2 “[...] Legal discourse is persuasive and not demonstrative” 
(WARAT, 2002, p.37). 
Clamour of 
purity 
5 “Kelsen acentuou a inexistência de uma metodologia jurídica 
adequada para construir uma teoria científica baseada na 
objetiva e sistemática descrição das normas positivas, bem 
como a necessidade de elaborá-la a partir de conceitos 
rigorosos que extirpassem do conhecimento jurídico qualquer 
tipo de interferência ideológica. Sugeria, também, a construção 
de uma epistemologia da qual se deveria retirar a crítica do 
saber jurídico tradicional, um saber inadequadamente assumido 
como científico” (WARAT, 2002, p.47). 
TABLE 4: METHODOLOGICAL LIMITS OF LEGAL DOGMATICS. 
SOURCE: Prepared from Warat (2002). 
 
 
In accordance to Tables 2, 3 and 4, contrary to Kelsen's closed proposal in 
related for other inspired or empiric-derived methods, in Warat's proposal, that goes 
in one direction close of the Ross, the search for interdisciplinary research practices 
Becomes the rule and always diving in the world and social reality.  
 
5.1.2 Constituent elements of critical epistemology 
 
From the epistemic, theoretical and methodological limits of legal dogmatic, 
indicated in subsection 5.1.1, in this subsection the main constituent elements of an 
epistemology with critical pretensions are explained (Table 5).  
 
 
CONSTITUINTE 
ELEMENT 
PARTS 
Provision of critical 
epistemology 
1.“Every critical theory is provisional, conjuncture and 
dependent on the state of development of research that 
accepts its limits and that responds to a logic of 
contradictions” (WARAT, 2002, p.21). 
Appeal against –
dogmatic 
2. Critical Epistemology 
“Leads us to the production of a counter-dogmatic object of 
knowledge, [which] seeks alternative theoretical historic mark 
to seek the role that should have the topical in the contexts of 
justification of positive law, the questionability of which is 
accepted” (WARAT, 2002, p.29-30). 
Emergence and 3.  The critical epistemology  
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fertility of a border “Seeks new opinions, which incorporates positive rigths, 
extending its borders, permeating its limits for the ingress of 
knowledge accumulated in other domains, overcoming the 
determinations that limit the legal knowledge cornered in the 
positive right, offering new problematics” (WARAT, 2002, 
p.30). 
Ideologies as 
obstacles 
4. 
a) "It is possible to advance with scientificity knowledge 
precisely because it considers accumulated knowledge" 
(WARAT, 2002, p.51). 
b) "The comprehension of each explanatory system is 
produce through the critique of its limits" (WARAT, 2002, 
p.51). 
c) "a method of producing an object of knowledge requires  a 
comprehension anticipated understanding of the limits of 
existing knowledge as the initial condition of the new process 
of objectification" (WARAT, 2002, p.52). 
Need for rupture 5. “We need for the Right an epistemological work of rupture. 
This is the epistemological activity before us today: the 
establishment of a critical theory of law. An epistemological 
level that transcends, incorporating what is redeemable from 
the Kelsenian theory, reformulating and denying some of its 
presuppositions, as well as analytic philosophy "(WARAT, 
2002, p. 43). 
Need of 
desecration 
6.“It is on the epistemological level that resistance can be 
produced to sacred demonstrations "(WARAT, 2002, p.44). 
First concept of 
epistemology 
7.“The rationalization of methodological experience is [...] its 
epistemology. [...] Epistemology would be the theoretical field 
where the knowledge about the methodological object is 
produced "(WARAT, 2002, p.52). 
TABLE 5: CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY. 
SOURCE: Prepared from Warat (2002). 
 
 
In Table 5,  are present seven excerpts cut-out of Warat's work are outlined 
that outline the contours of a critical epistemology, with open borders to the 
contaminations and fertilizations of other fields of knowledge and the concrete reality 
lived beyond the legal field. The key word that synthesizes Warat's critical 
epistemology is "rupture" (section 5), but what supports it are the complementary 
ideas of "profanation" (excerpt 6), of "dogmatic appeal" (excerpt 2). 
In short, for Warat (2002, p.54), "[...] legal thought manifests a double 
absence. Not if found the thematic nor the obstacles on methodological or 
epistemological", which leaves open the investigation about the constitution of the 
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field. 
Then, after indicating and highlighting several obstacles derived from the 
rationalist and empiricist traditions of modern science, he makes explicit his main 
claim for an anti-empirical epistemology for law, With a view to making way for an 
anti-dogmatic methodology (WARAT, 2002, p. 54). 
 
5.2 LIMITS OF WARAT'S INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAM 
 
It is about an investigative program focused on an anti-empiricist 
epistemology that claims an anti-dogmatic methodology, as a counterpoint to any 
investigation program derived or inspired by Kelsen (2009).  
In contrast to Habermas (2011 and 2012), Kuhn (2005), Foucault (1979 and 
1987) who value the need for explicit metaphysics (they are post-empiricists), Warat 
seizes metaphysics as an obstacle in the same sense as Bachelard (1974), as an 
epistemic obstacle that preclude legal knowledge from expanding. This explains his 
affection to the idea of rupture (which own Warat did not realize that is another 
metaphysics). Warat continued attach to the reductionist foundation of the analytic 
epistemological tendency in claiming the rupture with metaphysics, as Kelsen did. 
This seems to be one of its limits.  Overcoming could be associated with the need to 
construct an episteme that takes into account and does not break with metaphysics, 
reinforcing the need to construct knowledge as if it were a continuous exercise of 
weaving together, not dissociating. To identify and make explicit the place of 
metaphysics (utopia), not to hide it or to deny it in a mechanistic way. 
 
 
6 THE SCIENCE IN BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS 
 
Taking into account the discussion there were in section 1, the force-idea of 
this section is to make visible the contribution and limits of Santos' investigative 
program to the legal field. 
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6.1 CONTRIBUTION OF SANTOS 
 
In this sense, the main objective of Santos (1988, p. 9) is to make a sociology 
of law rhetoric and, for this, he carries out a comparative study between "the legal 
practice of state law of capitalist countries and legal practice within a neighbourhood 
[...] of Rio de Janeiro (Pasárgada) ". According to Santos, two legal sociologies, the 
positivist and the Marxist marginalize legal discourse. “For both sociological 
paradigms, legal discourse is a marginal area to the study of the structures of power 
and social control in society and contemporary and like as can be left to the domain 
of philosophical speculation” (SANTOS, 1988, p.5). 
Faced with this controversy, the author positions he by explaining his 
epistemic fundamentals focused on empiricism to extend to in legal pluralism. “[...] In 
the present work if explored some of the access routes sociological on the law 
discourse in the light of empirical investigations that also the interested the question 
of legal pluralism” (SANTOS, 1988, p.5). 
Taking as a reference a strategy close to that of Warat, Santos constructs his 
field of investigation from the identification of some limits of the hegemonic episteme 
of the field, the legal positivism. 
 
6.1.1 LIMITS OF THE HEGEMONIC LEGAL FIELD 
 
The epistemic fundament claimed by Santos is empirical, since it uses the 
contributions of Sociology and Anthropology. From this foundation, Santos identifies 
some limits of the hegemonic legal field (Table 6) to propose a pluralistic 
epistemology (Table 7). 
Are presented in Table 6, six cut sections from Santos' work, which allow 
identifying the main limits of the hegemonic legal field. It is a field focused on 
axiomatic (excerpt 1), in formal rationality (excerpt 2), in coercion (excerpt 4) and, in 
addition to these indicators, appropriates a legal ideology (excerpt 5) to apply the 
positive norm Like a fetish (excerpt 3). Finally, the idea of coexistence (section 6), 
under the domination of a colonialist episteme, prevails foundation logic of 
"juridicídios" (SANTOS, 2011) and (SANTOS and TRINDADE, 2003), that is, 
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massacre of legal systems not taken into account by official eyes simply because 
they are law systems derived from native social systems. 
 
 
LIMIT OF THE 
HEGEMONIC FIELD 
PARTS 
Axiomatic 1. “The topic-rhetoric conception has as its objective a 
critique, which pretends to be radical, to the prevailing jus-
philosophical conceptions, which have tried in various 
ways to convert legal science into a dogmatic or axiomatic 
one, from which it would be possible to deduce concrete 
solutions within the framework of a Closed system of 
techno-law rationality” (SANTOS, 1988, p.7). 
Formal Rationality 2. “Technical language, like formalism in general, is a 
distancing” (SANTOS, 1988, p.34). 
Norm as a fetish 3. On the official texts, which "[...] are used as legal 
fetishes and, like any other fetish, represent a frozen 
rhetoric, a silence of things that makes the words of 
discourse hyper-spoken” (SANTOS, 1988, p.43). 
Coercion 4. “when more powerful are the instruments of coercion 
at the service of lesser legal production tend to be the 
rhetorical space of legal discourse, and vice versa” 
(SANTOS, 1988, p.61). 
Legal Ideology 5. “[...] It is in this misappropriation of the remaining 
(supra-individual) dimensions that lies the ideological 
character of capitalist law construction” (SANTOS, 1988, 
p.93). 
Coexistence 6. “Contrary to traditional law, state law tends to present 
a higher level of institutionalization of the legal function and 
more powerful instruments of coercion - which in the 
colonial situation is particularly evident. In addition, 
concomitantly in its legal discourse tends to have a smaller 
rhetorical space in the colonial situation, since colonial 
domination / repression reproduces itself directly in the 
domination / repression of native languages.’” (SANTOS, 
1988, p.58). 
 
TABLE 6: LIMITS OF THE HEGEMONIC LEGAL FIELD. 
SOURCE: Prepared from Santos (1988). 
 
 
Table 6 makes it enable to visualize that through the topic-rhetoric conception 
Santos identifies some of the main limits of hegemonic conceptions in the legal field. 
The Framework also makes it possible to anticipate methodological procedures 
inspired and imported from socio-anthropology (participant observation). They are 
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procedures derived from inductive principles, for it is constitute not on the norms, but 
on concrete cases observed in social reality. 
 
6.1.2 Constituent elements of Santos' pluralist epistemology 
 
In this subsection, are introduce the main constituent elements of the Santos 
investigative program for the legal field. 
Are presented in Table 7, six-cut excerpt of Santos' work that allow us to 
delineate the contours of a pluralist epistemology for the legal field. Unlike Kelsen's 
investigative program (Section 3), fully aligned with the analytical trend; or Ross's 
(Section 4), aligned with the socio-historical tendency, Santos's proposal is close to 
the dialogical epistemic tendency (Figure 1, Section). Instead of worrying about the 
shielding or closure of the legal field, in a manner similar to Warat's (Section 5), all 
excerpt cut out indicate a concern to open the legal field to other domain of 
knowledge, whether these scientificity or not. In this perspective, Santos's 
investigative program has pluralist contours (section 1), Supports itself on a topic-
rhetoric (section 2) and on a common sense language (section 3).  Finally, to 
consolidate itself as an alternative legality (excerpt 6) it grasps its object of litigation 
not as a purely law phenomenon (claiming a pure episteme), but as a tangle (Figure 
2, Section 4) that does not lack coercion (excerpt 5) of a Leviathan to be managed. 
 
 
CONSTITUINTE 
ELEMENT 
PARTS 
Pluralism  “Legal discourse in general and judicial speech in particular are a   
pluralistic discourses that, while antithetical, it remains dialogic and 
horizontal” (SANTOS, 1988, p.8). 
“[...] The truth to which it aspires is always relative, and its 
conditions of validity never transcend the circumstantialism 
historical-concrete of the auditorium” (SANTOS, 1988, p.8). 
In Pasárgada, the residents' association acts as a judge (legal 
forum) for emerging problems. "In the light of official Brazilian law, 
the relationship of this type established within the slums are illegal 
or legally null” (SANTOS, 1988, p.14). 
In the interior of Pasárgada emerge a practice and a legal 
discourse, the law of Pasárgada, that the author propose to 
investigate and characterize as an indicator of a legal pluralism 
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Everything undergoes an inversion process, for "illegal occupation 
[...] becomes legal ownership and property” (SANTOS, 1988, 
p.14). 
Topic-rhetoric - 
topoi 
2. Pasargada's law "[...] is triggered through a legal discourse 
characterized by the very intense and complex use of legal 
rhetoric" (SANTOS, 1988, p. 17). 
This finding led the author to resort to the topical-rhetorical 
conception to analyse the processes of "reproduction of legality 
within Pasargada" (Santos, 1988, p.17). 
Contrary to what happens in the Law of asphalt (official), a 
construction starts from the concrete to the abstract. "The objective 
is to build progressively and by multiple approaches a decision that 
is accepted by the parties and for the relevant auditorium" 
(SANTOS, 1988, p.17-8). 
"A legal discourse dominated by the use of topoi4 is necessarily an 
open discourse and permeable to the influences of related 
discourses" (SANTOS, 1988, p.25). “A estrutura tópico-retórica do 
discurso transforma-se num antídoto eficaz do legalismo” 
(SANTOS, 1988, p.25).  
The legal discourse of Pasargada makes a great use of topoi and, 
simultaneously, a scarce use of law "(SANTOS, 1988, p. 43). 
"From the confrontation it is clear that in legal societies where law 
has a low level of institutionalization of the legal function and 
instruments of coercion that are not very powerful, legal discourse 
tends to be characterized by a broad rhetorical space" (SANTOS, 
1988, p. 57). 
"The structure of mediation is the topography of a space of mutual 
giving and reciprocal gain" (SANTOS, 1988, p. 21). 
"... The reconciliation of the parties takes preference over 
everything else in the resolution of litigation" (SANTOS, 1988, 
p.81). There is not one winner and another subdued like a right of 
the asphalt. 
Common sense 
language 
“The rhetorical circulation among non-professional participants 
presupposes a vulgar, non-professional common language, and it 
is in this language that Pasargada's legal discourse is dressed 
"(SANTOS, 1988, p. 34). 
"Being Pasárgada's legal discourse with a strong topic-rhetoric 
dominance, it is a non-legalistic legal discourse and, therefore, the 
law thought he projects is an essentially every day and common 
thought" (SANTOS, 1988, p.45). 
"Again in parallel with what it happens with forms and requirements 
procedural, the technical language of Pasargadae law does not 
create a distance that implies rupture, that is, that it changes 
                                                 
4 Consensus spaces, “viewpoints, or commonly accepted opinions” (SANTOS, 2011, p.17). 
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significantly and permanently the field of the relevant auditorium. It 
is a popular technical language "(SANTOS, 1988, p. 36).  
 
Litigious object 
as a tangle 
“Normativity rhizomatic "(SANTOS, 1988, p.42). The object of the 
processed of litigation - and through it, the oneself actual object of 
the litigation - is never established with rigidity, for it is itself object 
negotiated in elapse of the argument on the relevant matter" 
(SANTOS, 1988, p.45) . “ the participation in the exercise of tasks 
is more decisive than the hierarchy of functions” (SANTOS, 1988, 
p.53). 
Rhetoric of force 
= Coercion 
“[...] The law of Pasargada dispose of instruments of coercion very 
incipient and indeed almost non-existent” (SANTOS, 1988, p.55). 
“[...] The association may request the support of the police station 
located in the neighbourhood to imposed, by force, a decision” 
(SANTOS, 1988, p.55). 
“[...] In Pasárgada the main instruments of coercion are threats, 
the discourse of violence” (SANTOS, 1988, p.56). 
“[...] Although the resource of the police is often referred to as 
threat, it is only in extreme circumstances it is concretized” 
(SANTOS, 1988, p.56). 
“The topic-rhetorical rationality seems to move against two forms 
of violence: the violence of principles and absolute proofs, that 
succeed necessary solutions (the institutional-systemic logic to 
which aspires the bureaucratic instrument), and the physical and 
psychic violence of the coercive instrument.” (SANTOS, 1988, 
p.94). 
Alternative 
Legality 
“Despite all its precariousness, Pasargada's law represents the 
practice of an alternative legality and, as such, an alternative 
exercise of political power, although very embryonic” (SANTOS, 
1988, p.99). 
 
TABLE 7: CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF PLURALIST EPISTEMOLOGY 
SOURCE:  Prepared from Santos (1988). 
 
 
6.2 SELF-CRITICISM OF THE AUTHOR ABOUT ITS OWN APPROACH 
 
In this section, in a very honest and unusual way it are presented the main 
constituent elements of Santos' self-criticism to his own epistemic and theoretical 
choice. 
SELF-CRITICISM PARTS 
Need for refinement “[...] If it is true that Marxist theory is, in my understand, 
better condition to cover the vast analytical field mapped in 
Revista Jurídica                     vol. 02, n°. 47, Curitiba, 2017. pp. 433-467 
                                                                       DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.5187595 
  _________________________________________ 
 
462 
 
the present work, it is no less true that, for that to happen, it 
is necessary that it will tackle deficiencies, it here I 
suggested with very deep historical roots "(SANTOS, 1988, 
p.8” (SANTOS, 1988, p.88). 
Simplification “One of the shortcomings of the Marxist theorizing of law has 
been to attribute to it a general political function which, for 
too abstractly, leaves without an adequate cover an 
amalgam of secondary functions which, as has already been 
noted, ends up being accounted to title of ‘ambiguities’ of the 
law” (SANTOS, 1988, p.93). 
TABLE 8: SELF-CRITICSM OF THE AUTHOR ON THEIR OWN APPROACH                                                                                          
SOURCE: Prepared from Santos (1988). 
 
 
In Table 8, two clipping excerpt of Santos' work are presented that allow us to 
translate some of the main limits of the theoretical framework inspired by Marx to 
deal with the legal field. In section 1, Santos claims the need for refinement of 
criticism, and in section 2, it goes further by demonstrating with his reflections that 
there is another need more imperative than the first, to escape the simplifying and 
deductive temptation not necessarily of Marx, but of some of his most devoted 
followers. The legal field can not be reduced to an expression of the ideological 
superstructure created by the hegemonic groups of society. Santos' contribution 
shows that the legal field is much more than this. 
 
6.3  LIMITS OF TOPIC-RHETORIC 
 
In this section are presented, the main constituent elements of some limits 
identified by Santos about topical-rhetoric. 
 
 
LIMIT PARTS 
Emancipation or 
dissimulation of 
violence? 
“[...] When compared to the other 'discourses' (bureaucratic 
and coercitive) of law, is rhetorical discourse really the least 
violent, or is it the one that best dissemble violence?” 
(SANTOS, 1988, p.93-4). 
“As increases volume  and consolidates the inequality of the 
inhabitants of the rhetorical space grows, it makes sense to 
critically reconstruct rhetoric as a new form of violence, 
alongside bureaucratic violence and physical violence - 
symbolic violence” (SANTOS, 1988, p.96). 
TABLE 9: LIMITS OF TOPIC-RHETORIC 
SOURCE: Produced from Santos (1988). 
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In table 9 is presented a single excerpt containing two clippings of the work of 
Santos where the translate one of the most fundamental boundaries for  whom 
propose as to understand and to produce knowledge from the topic – rhetoric. It may 
be appropriate now as desire of emancipation, but it can be equally be taken as more 
another perverse form the dissimulation of physical and symbolic violence. It comply 
to highlight that the alert of Santos the need to be apprehended as a principle, the 
precautionary principle epistemic, but above all as an ethical precautionary principle 
of every subject epistemic. (SOUZA-LIMA, SILVA e BRAGA, 2013). 
 
 
7 THE CIENTIFICITY IN THE LEGAL FIELD 
 
Whereas the objective of the article was to reflect, from the epistemic criteria, 
theoretical and methodological, about the contours of the legal knowledge and the 
cientificity of the field, the idea-force of this section is to present a summary table 
containing the main constituent elements of the cientificity in the legal field from the 
investigative programs of each author analyzed.   
 
 
CIENTIFICITY KELSEN ROSS WARAT SANTOS 
EPISTEMIC Analytical 
trend 
Rationalism 
Reductionism 
Socio-
historical 
trend 
Empiricism 
Reductionism 
Socio- 
historical 
Trend 
Anti-empiricist 
No 
reductionism 
Dialogic trend 
Empiricist and 
Rationalist 
No 
reductionism 
THEORETICAL Abstract to 
concrete 
Application 
Purity 
Concrete to 
Abstract 
Application 
Syncretism 
Abstract 
Comprehensio
n 
Syncretism 
Concrete to 
Abstract 
Comprehensio
n 
Application 
Syncretism 
METHODOLOGIC
AL 
Deduction 
Monism 
Induction Anti-dogmatic 
Pluralism 
Topical-
rhetoric 
Dialectic 
Pluralism 
Participant 
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observation 
TABLE 10: THE CIENTIFICITY IN THE LEGAL FIELD. 
SOURCE: Developed by the authors from Kelsen (2009), Ross (2007), Warat (2002) e Santos 
(1988). 
 
 
Table 10 makes it visible that legal knowledge needs to be to apprehend not 
as a monolithic and pacific bloc, but rather as a field of coexistence (Souza-Lima and 
Knechtel, 2012) of senses and of epistemic interests, theoretical and methodological. 
Each of the authors studied claims for themselves the right to define what can and 
what it cannot characterized as a founder element of the cientificity of the legal field. 
Table 10 equally allows you to identify a movement of the opening of the field if we 
take as a reference – as Ground Zero – the contribution of Kelsen.  In the perspective 
of Epistemic, Kelsen to Santos, there is a "desecration"5 (Souza-Lima, 2013) of the 
field, for beside the reductionism rationalist inaugurated by the Viennese scholar; 
they pass coexist fundamentals empiricists, Anti-empiricists and Post-empiricists. In 
the theoretical perspective, the claims of purity are aggregated in concepts and 
definitions fertilized – these are the diverse expressions of syncretism rejected 
forcefully by Kelsen other fields of knowledge and socio-cultural practices. Finally, in 
the methodological perspective, the "desecration" of the legal field becomes more 
visible, as it is in this perspective that any framework epistemic/theoretical touches 
and is touched by the concrete world. Thus, beside the deductive monism (Kelsen 
proposal), to break out some strange methodological procedures and opponents of 
him. In this case, procedures focused in the direct contact with data of reality through 
the induction (proposal of Ross); of it psychoanalyzes (proposal of Warat); e finally, of 
the topical-rhetoric and the participant comment, both mattering of the anthropology 
for the legal field for Santos. 
 
 
 
 
 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS   
                                                 
5 In the sense of the intensity of the founding structures of the field with view to identifying limits and 
possibilities of overcoming to himself them in epistemic, theoretical and methodological terms. 
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Finally, the table 10 allow returning to the objective of the article that 
synthesize objectively in order to the main contributions and limits of each one of the 
analysed authors, beyond presenting the legal knowledge not as a monolithic block, 
but as a coexistence field. Another contribution of this article, beyond table 10, is that 
it supplies an analytical model of continuity of studies the legal field from other 
authors.  
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